The Pathways out of Poverty in Rural Indonesia: an empirical assessment by Timmer, Peter et al.
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Timmer, Peter; Weisbrod, Julian; McCulloch, Neil
Conference Paper
The Pathways out of Poverty in Rural
Indonesia: an empirical assessment
Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2006 / Verein für
Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics, No. 29
Provided in cooperation with:
Verein für Socialpolitik
Suggested citation: Timmer, Peter; Weisbrod, Julian; McCulloch, Neil (2006) : The Pathways
out of Poverty in Rural Indonesia: an empirical assessment, Proceedings of the German
Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2006 / Verein für Socialpolitik, Research




The Pathways out of Poverty in Rural Indonesia  













10 May 2006 
 








Since most poor live in rural areas, primarily engaged in low productivity farm activity, 
the pathway out of poverty must be strongly connected to productivity increases, whether 
they are realised in farming, rural non-farm enterprises or via urban migration. By 
utilizing the IFLS panel dataset for 1993 and 2000 from Indonesia, this paper shows, 
using empirical techniques, which pathways out of poverty were most successful in 
Indonesia’s past. Our findings suggest that the increased engagement of rural farmers in 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In light of the Millennium Development Goals, an increasing debate in 
development economics has focused on the measures necessary to achieve rapid poverty 
reduction. Whilst the past is not necessarily always a good guide to the future, knowing a 
bit more about the pathways through which poverty has been reduced in the past may 
give some useful insights into the approaches which may prove most effective in the 
future. It remains a fact that most poor live in rural areas and are primarily engaged in 
low productivity farm activity. Hence, the main pathway out of poverty must be strongly 
connected to productivity increases of the rural poor, whether they are realised in 
farming, rural non-farm enterprises or by urban migration. Indonesia gives for a 
particular interesting case study for multiple reasons. Firstly, it experienced high and 
sustained economic growth; secondly, it is large enough to display spatial and sectoral 
diversity, and thirdly, it has rather extensive micro-panel-datasets (IFLS, 1993 & 2000) 
which allows a detailed investigation. 
There has been a growing literature over the past ten years that focuses on the role 
of non-farm enterprises as engines of rural development and income growth. The main 
discussion in this literature centres on the question if non-farm enterprises are merely an 
insurance activity for poor local farmers against crop failure or whether they are, or 
potentially can be - given the absence of certain constraints, a source of dynamics, 
facilitating growth and poverty alleviation, in particular, in rural areas. In turn, this 
literature is strongly connected to the considerable efforts of recent years to understand 
the nature of pro-poor growth which inevitably must encompass the rural poor and their 
potential pathways out of poverty (theoretical: Johnston and Mellor, 1961; Mellor, 1996; 
Foster and Rosenzweig, 2004; empirical: Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2001; Datt and 
Ravallion 1996, 1998, 2002, etc.).  
This paper contributes to this discussion by empirically assessing the individual 
income development and poverty in Indonesia over time, employment sector and space 
utilising mainly the Indonesian IFLS panel datasets 1993 and 2000, as well as SUSENAS 
data. The paper is structured as follows, section 2 will describe the conceptual 
background and reviews some of the existing theoretical and empirical literature, section   3
3 consists of descriptive statistics, aggregate macro and micro evidence. Section 4 
analyses the IFLS panel data and discusses the results, before we conclude and draw 
some policy implications in the final section. 
  
2. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Since the early works of Lewis one of the main questions in development 
economics has remained the nature of “structural transformation” and the dynamic 
growth path a developing economy must engage to enter a phase of sustained growth and 
thus rapid poverty reduction. Various elaborate models have been developed which 
describe the nature and the dynamics of such a rapid development process from all 
conceivable emphasizes and points of view. However, a very simple framework that 
identifies two key pathways out of poverty and the two associated “transitions”, as laid 
out in figure 1, is implicitly common to all models concerning “structural transformation” 
and poverty reduction.  
   














































Share of income from non-farm activities   4
 
 
There are arguably two paths out of poverty, firstly, the move from subsistence 
farming to commercial farming.  This includes both intensification through raising 
productivity of food crops, as well as diversification into higher value crops whether food 
or non-food. This also includes those who exit poverty by gaining better paid 
employment on such commercial farms (Pathway 1). Secondly, the increase of the 
productivity and profitability of non-farm enterprises or benefiting from others doing so 
by finding better paid more formal employment in such enterprises (Pathway 2). 
Moreover, there are also two “transition phases” which individuals may go 
through to reach the second route out of poverty. Firstly, a shift out of subsistence 
agriculture towards petty trading and manufacturing as well as local non-tradeable service 
provision (Transition Path A). Alternatively, rural-urban migration – which can come 
both from households currently engaged in subsistence agriculture and those currently 




Given the complex nature of the development process we believe that this 
simplification of development dynamics allows us to identify the key drivers behind 
poverty reduction which is an interesting academic exercises in itself, but most 
importantly inherently useful for policy makers. All of the pathways described above 
have received extensive attention in the literature either theoretically, empirically or both. 
Due to the limited space we will focus on few articles which highlight the role of 
agriculture and rural non-farm enterprises in the Asian pro-poor growth context.   
There does seem to be widespread agreement in the literature on the basic 
linkages connecting agriculture and overall economic growth that were first articulated to 
a general economics audience by Lewis (1954) and Johnston-Mellor (1961).  At a 
conceptual level, these linkages have long been part of the core of modern development 
theory and practice (Timmer, 1988; 2002; Tiffin, 2004). Establishing the empirical value 
of these linkages in different settings has been a cottage industry since the early 1970s 
(Byerlee, 1973; Mellor and Lele, 1973; King and Byerlee, 1978; Hazell and Roell, 1983;   5
Haggblade, Hammer and Hazell; 1991, Hazell and Haggblade, 1993; Timmer, 1997; 
Delgado, Hopkins and Kelly, 1998; Fan, Hazell and Thorat, 2000; Fan, Zhang and Zhang, 
2002; Fan, Thorat and Rao, 2004). Virtually all of these studies conclude that the 
“agriculture multiplier” is significantly greater than one, especially in relatively closed, 
“non-tradable” economies of the sort found in rural Africa, where the multiplier is often 
between 2 and 3.  But even in the more open economies of Asia, where border prices can 
be reasonably stable in the face of significant changes in domestic agricultural output, the 
agriculture multiplier is close to 2 in the early stages of agricultural modernization when 
productivity gains are the fastest. Because economic growth usually has a direct impact 
on poverty, any contribution agriculture makes to speeding overall economic growth 
through these large multipliers will, in most circumstances, also directly contribute to 
reducing poverty (Dollar and Kraay, 2002; World Bank, 2004a). 
An additional set of linkages makes growth originating in the agricultural sector 
tend to be more “pro-poor” than it would be if the source of growth came from the 
industrial or service sectors (Mellor, 1976; Ravallion and Datt, 1996; Ravallion and 
Chen, 2004; Timmer, 2002). New agricultural technologies that improve farm 
productivity strengthen this connection.  Separate reviews by Thirtle, et al. (2004) and by 
Majid (2004) confirm the strong empirical link between higher agricultural productivity 
and poverty reduction. One explanation for more rapid and pro-poor economic growth of 
agricultural productivity gains as compared to urban bias is provided by Mellor’s model 
of agricultural growth, rural employment and poverty reduction that emphasizes the role 
of the rural non-tradable sector in pulling underemployed workers out of agriculture into 
the non-agricultural rural economy.  The Mellor model explicitly integrates manufactured 
export performance (the source of much dynamism in East Asia’s economies since the 
1960s) and the non-tradable sector in the rural economy (which includes a wide array of 
local agro-processing) to explain subsequent reductions in poverty.  This model, drawing 
on Mellor’s earlier work in India (Mellor, 1976) and more recently in Egypt (Mellor, 
2000), explains why countries with substantial agricultural sectors that experienced rapid 
growth from labour-intensive manufactured exports had such good records of overall 
economic growth and poverty reduction.     6
Understanding of the determinants of poverty and the mechanisms for reducing it 
in a sustainable fashion has undergone a quiet revolution in the past decade.  Part of this 
understanding is the recognition that economic growth is the main vehicle for reducing 
poverty, but for this to work the distribution of income must not deteriorate too sharply.  
In many circumstances, growth in the agricultural sector has been an important ingredient 
in the formula that connects economic growth to the poor (Ravallion and Huppi, 1991; 
Ravallion and Datt, 1996; Ravallion and Chen, 2004; Sumarto and Suryahadi, 2003; Fan, 
Zhang and Zhang, 2004; Fan, Thorat and Rao, 2004; Timmer, 1997, 2004b).   
Furthermore, with more open trade possibilities, low prices for staple cereals in 
world markets, and population growth slowing, the size and relevance of these linkages 
are no longer so clear.  Agriculture must be dynamic and profitable if it is to help reduce 
rural poverty, and growing staple cereals has not been a source of dynamism in rural 
economies for two decades.  A profitable agriculture with rising productivity will now 
depend on diversification into crops and livestock with better demand prospects than for 
cereals, and into production for the agri-business sector, which can add value through 
processing and enhanced consumer appeal. 
 
CONNECTING THE RURAL ECONOMY TO POVERTY REDUCTION: THE ASIAN 
EXPERIENCE 
 
A close reading of the four Asian country studies for the pro-poor growth project 
(World Bank, 2005) suggests three fundamentally different, and inconsistent, stories 
about the role of agriculture in pro-poor growth.  First, the Indian case study by Besley, 
Burgess and Esteve-Volart (BBEV)(2004) argues on the basis of an enormously rich data 
set and very sophisticated econometrics that agriculture has played a minimal role at best 
in India’s reduction of poverty. This result directly contradicts earlier, and seminal, 
findings by Ravallion and Datt (1996, 1998 & 2002). The Bangladesh case study (B. Sen, 
Mujeri and Shahabuddin, 2004) and Vietnam case study (Bonschab and Klump, 2004) 
each argue that agriculture played a large and crucial role in poverty reduction, but for 
highly idiosyncratic reasons based on unique initial conditions and domestic institutions.    7
Agriculture was important to pro-poor growth in both countries, but that role cannot be 
generalized to other countries.   
  
The Indonesian case study (Timmer, 2005) argues that conscious policy stimulus 
to agriculture was the key to the country’s 30-year record of rapid, pro-poor growth (from 
1967 to 1997), and that the model of smallholder agricultural development used by 
Indonesia is quite general.  The Indonesian model is explicitly set in the broader historical 
literature on the role of agriculture and economic development that has been generated by 
successful countries not burdened with highly skewed land distributions as a starting 
point for their development (Johnston and Mellor, 1961; Hayami and Ruttan, 1985, 
Timmer, 1988, 2002). 
Finally, to add to the confusion, Ravallion and Chen (2004) report that nearly all 
of the remarkable reduction in poverty in China between 1980 and 2001 was the result of 
agricultural growth specifically and diversified rural economic growth more broadly.   
They can find very little impact from growth in urban industrial and service sectors on 
reductions in the headcount poverty index (or the poverty gap or squared poverty gap). 
Thus, the key question is, “what would the Asian poverty record look like if these 
countries had ignored their agricultural sectors?” Posing the counterfactual in this fashion 
is rather sobering, for it suggests that the “agriculture does not matter” results are missing 
an important part of the historical story. The very ambitious analysis by Smith and Urey 
(2002) of the relationship between agricultural growth and poverty reduction in India 
since 1950 shows very clearly the important investments and policy attention to reaching 
India’s rural poor through institutional and technical change in agriculture.  This attention 
before the Green Revolution established an environment in which the new technologies 
could have widespread impact on both the rural and urban poor.   
Finally, asking about the role of agriculture in pro-poor growth seems to be asking 
the question in too narrow a fashion.  All four of the country studies, and the Ravallion-
Chen study of China, note (sometimes just in passing) that the rural non-farm economy 
has been (or in the case of Vietnam, could be) an important mechanism for connecting 
the poor to economic growth.  It is here that the linkages among agricultural growth per 
se, overall economic growth, and the connection of the poor to that growth, become   8
crucial, for most of these linkages are likely to be transmitted via the rural non-farm 
economy (and via changes in food prices for economies that are not totally open to world 
markets or which might be “large” actors in those markets, such as the countries in Asia 
under review).  The World Bank review of the Bangladesh rural non-farm sector (World 
Bank, 2004b) has an especially clear framework for understanding these linkages, and 
measuring their empirical relevance in Bangladesh.  A similar review is underway in 
Indonesia. 
It is clear that rural non-farm enterprises are particularly pro-poor, as they tend to 
use factors of production at their real opportunity costs to the economy, so they are often 
labour intensive in nature, reducing underemployment, help smooth income seasonally 
and bid up local wages. Additionally, small and medium enterprises generate more 
employment per unit of capital than big firms; in general, wages in the non-farm sector 
are higher than in agriculture, so the low productivity residual activities do not seem to 
dominate this sector. Furthermore, they often produce low quality goods that are 
consumed by the poor, which benefit by obtaining local goods at lower prices, rather than 
expensive imports. Although the distributional impact of non-farm employment is not 
entirely clear, the non-farm sector seems to be mostly inequality reducing, as it might be 
the only possibility for low skilled workers to increase their incomes (Lanjouw and 
Lanjouw, 2001). 
A reader from outside Asia, seeking lessons for Latin America or Africa from 
these five countries, would be excused for being totally confused.  Gains in food crop 
production, stimulated by government investments, subsidies to inputs, and guaranteed 
output prices, were the initial basis for pro-poor growth in all these countries. But now 
those same policy instruments are counterproductive both for growth and the poor.   
Agriculture needs to restructure into a diversified and commercialized sector that will 
have little direct impact on the poor, even through food prices.  At this stage, especially in 
India and Indonesia, agriculture’s main impact on poverty is more likely to come through 
its support for a dynamic rural non-farm economy, which will be a bridge for the rural 
poor to cross on their way to jobs in the formal economy. 
This role does not show up in the econometric tests of agriculture’s contribution 
to poverty reduction, for two reasons.  First, this “new” agriculture is still largely nascent,   9
and hence does not appear in the statistical record very clearly.  Second, the impact will 
be through the linkages and multipliers that have been hard to conceptualize, model and 
estimate, because they depend so crucially on local conditions and institutional context.  
That does not mean that the role of agriculture in pro-poor growth has diminished to the 
point of being irrelevant.  It does mean that agriculture’s role must be understood in the 
context of multi-sectoral and general equilibrium frameworks, not through a sectoral lens 
alone. 
The CGE model developed by Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) attempts to do this. 
It models the rural economy as a three-sector economy encompassing agriculture, non-
farm non-tradable goods and services and non-farm tradable goods. Income growth is 
realised in two main ways: either by the increase in agricultural productivity due to 
technological change or by increasing urban or world demand for manufactured goods 
produced in rural areas. So both sources of productivity growth, agriculture and increased 
non-farm activities, can raise income and alleviate poverty. The main prediction of the 
model is that increased demand for manufactured goods can be the most pro-poor change, 
as it both raises income and reduces local and spatial inequality. Empirically they also 
show, using panel data from India, those regions with the slowest growth in agricultural 
high yielding varieties experienced the greatest increase in the rural non-farm tradable 
sector. This is because capital is mobile and seeks low wage opportunities in the 
agriculturally poorer regions. In other words, those rural areas, which did not manage to 
raise incomes due to agricultural productivity increases, found their productivity growth 
in the non-farm sector.  
Datt and Ravallion (1998) report rather different, but compatible, results.  They 
confirm empirically that the main source of poverty reduction in Indian states was 
agricultural productivity growth or divergence from the trend non-farm output growth. 
Moreover, the initial endowment with human and physical infrastructure is found to be a 
crucial precondition for the long run impact on poverty reduction in India, as they can be 
seen as a prerequisite for the success of non-farm enterprises. Their findings would 
suggest that a policy focus on agricultural productivity growth should alleviate poverty 
across the board as long as non-farm enterprise constraints from infrastructure and human 
capital are mitigated. However, it might be harder to raise agricultural productivity   10
growth in certain regions of the world than it is to alleviate the constraints facing non-
farm enterprises.  The Rural Investment Climate Assessment of the World Bank in 
Indonesia is currently investigating those possible constraints. 
In summary, the literature suggests that the rural economy is far from being 
passive and stagnant, merely producing primary products for the rest of the economy. In 
most developing countries rural non-farm output accounts for roughly half of rural 
income. Despite the fact that some non-farm activity is surely of the low-productivity 
insurance type (and important to the poor for that reason), it is equally clear that the rural 
non-farm sector often enjoys greater potential for growth in income than the agricultural 
counterpart. This is especially true for rural regions that enjoy high levels of physical 
infrastructure and human capital, as such regions can reach higher productivity levels due 
to effective demand for their goods and services. We argue that this rise in productivity in 




3. EVIDENCE ABOUT PATHWAYS OUT OF POVERTY 
 
Figure 1 presents an empirical challenge. To understand what have been the most 
important paths out of poverty it would be useful to know how many people there are in 
each of the cells of the diagram and how many of them managed to move from one cell to 
the other, and by how much they improved their welfare, given their personal 
characteristics. Leaving aside the distinction between low and high productivity for the 
moment, Table 1 shows the numbers of people working in agriculture and outside of 
agriculture utilising the SUSENAS
4 surveys in 1982, 1993 and 2002 as a very crude 
estimate using the biggest dataset available. 
The macro evidence of the SUSENAS survey suggests a remarkable movement 
out of agriculture over the last twenty years.  The share of workers in agriculture dropped 
from 54% in 1982 to 45% in 2002.  Moreover, there has been an even more marked fall 
in the share of workers in rural non-agriculture; the major growth has been in the share of 
workers working outside agriculture in urban areas which has more than doubled in 20 
                                                 
4 SUSENAS is the national household survey conducted by the Indonesian Government   11
years.  This suggests that migration to urban areas may have been as important as shifts 
between sectors as a driver of changes in the structure of employment. However, it is not 
quite clear how many of the former rural centres have been reclassified as Urban as 
results of the administrative reforms, but presumably the most likely candidates are 
vibrant rural non-farm centres. Hence, it is likely that there is an upward bias in “urban 




5 in Agriculture and Non Agriculture 
   1982  1993  2002 
   N (000)  %  N (000)  %  N (000)  % 
                    
Agriculture 30,487  54.24  39,137  49.88  39,035  44.92 
Non Agriculture  25,724  45.76  39,329  50.12  47,874  55.08 
   Rural  15,939  28.36  18,992  24.20  16,785  19.31 
   Urban  9,785  17.41  20,337  25.92  31,088  35.77 
                    
All sector  56,211  100  78,466  100  86,909  100 
                    
Source: Susenas, 1982, 1993, 2002 
Note: exclude Aceh, Maluku, North Maluku and Papua 
 
Moreover, Table 1 presents the aggregate numbers of people working in 
agriculture and non-agriculture in rural and urban areas – it does not directly tell us about 
the numbers of people moving from agricultural to non-agriculture. Although these 
figures are suggestive about the pathways which may be the most important, they are not 
definitive since all that is shown is the net position rather than the actual flows 
themselves.  Unfortunately, the SUSENAS surveys prior to 2004  did not have a panel 
element so it is impossible to observe directly the number of workers shifting sector.  
Furthermore, the lack of a panel element does not allow us to identifying the key 
characteristics that allowed individuals to increase their welfare by shifting sectors. In 
other words, the aggregate evidence tells us nothing about the micro-economic 
determinants, - most notably education, location, etc. - of sectoral employment shifts and 
                                                 
5 Employment is defined as self employed without help, self employed with help of 
householders/temporary workers, self employed with help of regular workers, employees and family 
workers with age 10 years and over (definition until 1997). Definition of employment since 1998 is the 
same as above, but persons 15 years and above.   12





To explore the microeconomic determinants of exiting poverty requires a panel 
data set over a reasonable length of time.  Fortunately, the Indonesia Family Life Survey 
(IFLS) was first conducted in 1993 (IFLS1) and then again in 1997 (IFLS2), 1998 
(IFLS2+) and finally in 2000 (IFLS3).  For IFLS1, 7,224 households were interviewed 
with data collected on 22,000 individuals in those households. This sample represents 
about 83% of Indonesian population in 13 provinces. In 1993, IFLS did a face to face 
interview with the household head, the spouse, a sample of their children and a sample of 
other household members. In 1997, 94% of IFLS1 households were re-interviewed 
consisting of all 1993 “main” respondents and all 1993 household members born before 
1967.  In 2000, IFLS managed to re-contact 95.3% of IFLS1 households interviewing: all 
1993 “main” respondents, all 1993 household members born before 1967 and a sample of 
other 1993 household members. The sample size in 2000 was 10,400 households and 
39,000 individuals. 
 
The IFLS collects data at two levels: 
1.  Information collected at the individual and household levels consisting of: 
a.  consumption, income and assets 
b.  education, migration, and labour market outcomes 
c.  marriage, fertility and contraceptive use 
d.  health status, use of health care and health insurance 
e.  relationships among co resident and non co resident family members 
f.  processes underlying household decision-making 
g.  transfers among family members and inter-generational mobility 
h.  participation in community activities 
2.  Detailed information from the communities in which IFLS households are located 
including: 
a.  physical and social environment 
b.  infrastructure 
c.  employment opportunities 
d.  food prices 
e.  access to health and educational facilities   13
f.  the quality and prices of services available at health and educational 
facilities 
 
Unfortunately, the 1997 data on sectoral employment and migration were not published – 
thus for our analysis we will use only data from 1993 and 2000.   
 
Our overall aim is to understand the determinants of movements out of poverty 
considering sectoral and location shifts.  For this reason, the panel used for our analysis 
consists of the individuals who were between the ages of 15 and 55 in 1993 and were 
working.  For these individuals we have an estimate of their income
6, individual, 
household and community characteristics, as well as whether they shifted sector of 
employment and whether they moved location. This sample selection and the connected 
methodology chosen is the only feasible way to track individuals, their characteristics, 
and their associated income level over time; and thus to answer the question at hand: 
namely, what kind of individuals with what characteristics, used which pathway to 
increase their income. There are two main caveats associated with this choice; firstly the 
sample used for analysis does not account for the unemployed as well as newcomers to 
the labour market, i.e. individuals which entered the labour force after 1993. Secondly, 
the subsequent regressions are focused on individual earnings of main household 
members. Poverty is clearly a phenomenon that is experienced at the household level 
since in most household there is some pooling of resources within the household. 
However, other studies show that most poverty transitions occur due to changes in 
income of key household members. Thus, keeping those caveats in mind and given the 
data available and the question asked, we deem our sample choice the most reasonable. 
This restricted sample of earners in 1993 between 15 and 55 is the underlying sample for 
all the subsequent analysis. 
 
                                                 
6 The IFLS collected data on individual income.  This is calculated as the sum of gross profit, net profit, 
and wages.  Combining these attributes too much income to individuals since, for some households, 
multiple members will contribute towards the profits from a household enterprise.  We therefore tested for 
the possible biases which this might impact.  In addition calculations were done using individual income 
sources (wages, net profits, gross profits) to test the robustness of the results. The main findings were not 
altered substantially, the results are available on request.   14
POVERTY LINE 
 
The poverty line used for all the analysis below is derived from the 2002 BPS 
poverty line.
 7   For 1993 BPS also calculated a poverty line, but they use a methodology 
which is rather different than that used for the calculation of the 2002 poverty line.
 8  To 
ensure that the poverty line in 1993 represents the same purchasing power as that in 2000, 
the easiest approach would be to take the 2002 poverty line and deflate it using the 
provincial consumer price index (CPI) published by BPS.  However, the published CPI 
uses a set of weights for its subindices which are heavily weighted in favour of wealthy 
consumers in urban areas.
9 This provides a bias in the CPI which is particularly 
inappropriate for the analysis that we wish to do.  In particular, since food prices rose 
more quickly than other prices over the period and the poor have a much higher share of 
their expenditure on food than the better off, the published CPI understates the inflation 
experienced by the poor over this period.  When this downwards biased CPI is used as a 
deflator for the poverty line, it produces a poverty line that is too high in 1993 and 
implausibly high measured levels of poverty.  For this reason we re-weighted the 
individual commodity group indices from the CPI published for each province using the 
expenditure shares for each commodity group of the bottom quintile in 1996. All 
subsequently reported real figures are deflated utilising the method described above. 
 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Table 2 shows some of the key variables from the panel for 1993 and 2000.
 10  
Firstly the mean real income among our sample rose between 1993 and 2000, but only by 
around 3.5%. However, as is often the case with income data, the mean is distorted by 
high outliers. We therefore calculate median real income too.  This is a little more than 
half mean income in both years and grew by only 12.5% over the 7 year period. 
  
                                                 
7 This uses a variant of the Bidani and Ravallion (??year) methodology for calculating poverty lines – see 
?? for details. 
8 The BPS methodology for the calculation of the poverty line changed in 1996.  
9 For example, the CPI share on food is 34% [check??] – the food share of the bottom quintile is 66%. A 
detailed account of this problem is to be found in Grimm and Günther (2006) 
10 Table A1 in Appendix 1 provides a detailed listing of the all the variables used in the analysis as well as 
their definitions.  Tables A2 and A3 in Appendix 2 provide summary statistics for all variables.     15
 




Mean in 1993  Median in 
1993 
Mean in 2000  Median in 2000 
Real income  194,658.6  95904  201,686***  107916 
Age 37,11  36  45,03***  44 
Years of Schooling  5,91  6  6,40***  6 
Household Size  4,83  5  5,83***  6 
Urban 0,35    0,42   
Non-farm 0,68    0,66   
Note: Sample is individuals between the age of 15-55 in 1993 and earning income in 1993. Means in 2000 
marked by *** denotes statistic significantly different mean to 1993 sample at the 1% significance level. 
All summary statistics calculated using individual probability weights for 1993 and 2000 respectively 
 
Secondly, the number of years of education also rose from 5.9 to 6.4 over the 
seven years of the panel, suggesting that some of the younger members of the panel 
continued education between 1993 and 2000.  Demographic changes are also clearly 
illustrated: the average household size increases by one over the period of the panel with 
a shift towards more adults in the typical household as the children grow up. 
Many of the panel respondents have also moved to urban areas.  In 1993 35% of 
respondents lived in urban areas – in 2000, 42% did – a striking change in only 7 years. 
Finally, the overall share of respondents working outside agriculture has remained almost 
unchanged at around two-thirds over the period
11.  However, individual sectors have seen 
significant change most notably the share of respondents in manufacturing declined from 
15.5% to 10.7%, whilst those working in social services rose from 14.8% to 19.6%, 
reflecting the impact of the crisis and the growing informal service economy. 
 
                                                 
11 The larger proportion of people living in urban areas compared to Table 1 SUSENAS figures is about 
10%, but at least partly plausible given that the IFLS dataset excludes the most rural provinces and that our 
restricted sample does not include people which don’t declare any earnings, however, the suspicion of an 
urban bias in the IFLS dataset or a rural bias in the SUSENAS can not be completely dismissed. 
Furthermore the constant share of people in non-farm enterprises as compared to increasing and lower 
share of non-farm employment in the SUSENAS dataset is again partly plausible mentioned for the reasons 
above and the plausibility that the younger Indonesians are moving more into the non-farm enterprise 
sector, but are excluded from our IFLS sample.    16
INCOME GROWTH 
 
Table 1 above inferred the rates of sectoral growth and migration from the 
aggregate data.  However, with the IFLS panel it is possible to directly calculate income 
growth for individuals who were working in particular sectors or regions.  Table 3 shows 
the median income growth for individuals according to whether they lived in rural or 
urban areas and whether they worked in agriculture or outside of agriculture for 1993 and 
2000. Table 3 shows an intriguing story of how income and income growth is associated 
with sectoral transition and rural-urban migration.  Firstly, when one examines the 
incomes of each group in 1993, the dramatic impact of both urban location and work 
outside of agriculture is evident: agricultural workers earn around half the income of 
those working outside agriculture in both rural and urban areas; similarly rural workers 
(whether farm or non-farm) earn little more than half the income of workers in the same 
sector in urban areas. 
Consider how the typical worker in each group fared.  The vast majority of rural 
farm workers in 1993 continued to be rural farm workers in 2000 and saw their real 
incomes decline by 12%.  Almost all of those who moved out of farming in rural areas 
did so by moving to non-farm activities in rural areas; these individuals saw their real 
incomes rise by more than a quarter.  So few of these individuals moved to urban areas 
that we do not place any confidence on the income growth figures for these transitions.  
However, we note that real income fell by 8% between 1993 and 2000 for this, the 
poorest category of worker, with only those that shifted out of agriculture managing to 
increase their incomes significantly. 
Workers who were already working outside agriculture in rural areas in 1993 
were already much better off than their agricultural counterparts.  Around 70% of these 
workers stayed in the same sector, seeing their incomes rise by 10% over the period.  
However, more than a fifth of these workers fell back into the agricultural sector and 
experience a sharp reduction in their real incomes as a result.  By contrast a small number 
managed to obtain non-farm work in urban areas – in fact these workers did not fare 
particularly well, their incomes fell by 10%, but it is worth noting that those that managed 
to migrate to non-farm jobs in urban areas started out with incomes 60% higher than the   17
median income for rural non-farm workers in 1993.  The handful of individuals who 
found work in the agricultural sector in urban areas saw their incomes collapse, but again 
we treat this result with caution given the very small number of individuals involved. 
Urban agricultural workers are the smallest category in our sample.  Almost half 
of these workers stayed in the same sector and managed to maintain their real incomes, 
thereby doing considerably better than rural agricultural workers over the same period.  
Over a quarter managed to obtain work outside agriculture still within the urban area 
thereby raising their incomes further.  More than a fifth moved back into rural areas, but 
doing so was associated with substantial declines in income regardless of whether they 
went into to farming or non-farming activities.  Intriguingly it tended to be the better off 
urban farmers who moved back to rural areas. 
Finally, the majority of the richest group, urban non-farm workers, stayed in this 
category and experienced a 7% fall in their real incomes, probably associated with the 
economic crisis of the late 1990s.  An unlucky 5% of this group shifted to urban 
agricultural activities and saw their income fall by 39%.  A further 5% shifted back into 
rural areas whilst staying in non-agricultural activities – this group saw its income rise by 
25%.  (A handful of others shifted back into rural agriculture – by coincidence all of these 
individuals report zero income in 2000, but once again we interpret this result with 
caution given the small numbers involved.)   
Overall how should we interpret these results?  Three themes appear to emerge.  
Firstly, for the poorest who are mostly employed in rural agriculture, getting out of 
agriculture was key to increasing their incomes.  Only a handful of these individuals were 
able to migrate to urban areas – but almost a fifth escaped from agriculture and in doing 
so substantially increased their incomes.  Conversely, for those that had already escaped 
agriculture, moving back into agriculture was a sign of distress – all shifts back into 
agriculture from non-agricultural employment were associated with major income 
collapses. 
Secondly, most of those who migrated to non-farm jobs in urban areas were 
already doing non-agricultural jobs in rural areas and tended to be amongst the better off 
non-farm rural workers.  But only 6% of rural non-farm workers managed to move to 
urban areas – whilst almost a quarter fell back into agriculture.   18
Thirdly, movements from urban non-farm employment to rural non-farm 
employment appear not to be associated with distress.  This suggests that these better off 
workers may move back to rural areas voluntarily for the purpose of investment in their 




The income growth table shows what happened to incomes.  But this does not 
necessarily translate into movements in and out of poverty.  To evaluate this Table 4 
shows a detailed poverty transition matrix between 1993 and 2000, disaggregated by rural 
and urban as well as agricultural and non-agriculture.  The poverty of individuals is of 
course determined by the level of welfare of their whole households.  We therefore 
determine the poverty status of individuals who were aged between 15 and 55 in 1993 
and were earning income by whether the per capita expenditure of their households fell 
above or below the poverty line.
12 
Consider first those individuals who were working in rural agriculture in 1993 and 
came from poor households.  Over 80% of these individuals stay working in rural 
agriculture, but more than half of the households from which they come still managed to 
exit from poverty.  The remaining fifth or so moved out of rural agriculture and, more 
often than not out of poverty too. 
Individuals from poor rural households who worked off-farm in 1993 were 
substantially more mobile.  A little less than a fifth stayed poor in rural non-agricultural 
activities, whilst a further 18.5% stayed poor but shifted to agriculture, but 14% managed 
to exit poverty through this route. However, two-fifths moved out of poverty whilst 
staying in rural non-farm activities.  Although more of these individuals moved to urban 
areas than individuals who were working in agriculture, it was still fewer than 10% of 
this group who moved to urban areas, and only half of those that did so exited poverty.   
Around half of the urban agricultural poor stayed poor – most of them continuing 
to work in urban agriculture.  But 21% exited poverty whilst continuing to work in urban 
agriculture.  Of the 30% who shift to non-agricultural activities in urban areas, more than 
                                                 
12 The definition of the poverty line is mentioned in the section above   19
half exited poverty.  The poor in urban non-agricultural jobs showed much less sectoral 
and geographical mobility – with 90% staying in the same sector and in urban areas.  Half 
of these individuals exited poverty. 
One can also look at Table 4 from the perspective of the vulnerability of falling 
into poverty.  Individuals working in rural agriculture who came from non-poor 
households had a roughly one-in-five chance of falling into poverty.  Almost all of those 
who did so, staying working in the same sector.  Again those in non-agricultural pursuits 
in rural areas exhibited more sectoral mobility, but with a rather lower probability 
(14.5%) of falling into poverty.  One intriguing finding is that there appears to be a high 
degree of sectoral movement in and out of agriculture amongst the non-poor in rural areas 
with around a fifth of the non-poor in rural agriculture moving into non-agricultural 
activities and a similar share moving in the opposite direction.  This sectoral switching 
also occurs for the poor working outside agriculture, 32% of whom switch back into 
agriculture, but not for the poor working in agriculture who are much less likely to switch 
out of agriculture.  This points to constraints for the poor in exiting agriculture.  It also 
suggests that agriculture may be a “fall-back” option for those working in non-
agricultural jobs in rural areas.   
The non-poor in urban agriculture were the most sectorally mobile group.  Only 
41% stayed in urban agricultural work.  Around a fifth fell into poverty – most often in 
the same sector and location.  But a quarter stayed out of poverty by shifting to non-
agricultural jobs in urban areas, whilst a further fifth moved back to agriculture in rural 
areas without falling into poverty.  By contrast, the non-poor working in non-agricultural 
employment were the least mobile group.  Over three-quarters stayed in the same location 
and sector; of the 13% that did fall into poverty, the vast majority did so without 
changing sector or urban location. 
 
It is useful to stand back and consider the key lessons from these results.  We emphasize 
four:  
1.  Most of the rural agricultural poor who exit poverty do so whilst staying in rural 
agriculture.  Moving out of agriculture is hard – moving to urban areas for this 
group is extremely rare.   20
2.  For the poor, rural non-agricultural activities are a transitory stepping stone – 
either out of poverty in rural areas (for the majority), or back to agricultural 
poverty (for a sizeable minority).  Urban migration plays a role, but a minor one. 
3.  Non-agricultural activities in urban areas are by far the most stable, perhaps 
because the earnings are so much higher in urban areas that the poor prefer to stay 
in the hope of a good job; or perhaps because it is difficult for poor urban workers 
to move or return to rural areas. 
4.  Over this period, the chances of exiting from rural poverty were actually higher 
than the chances of exiting urban poverty.  However, the chances of falling back 
into to poverty were much higher (20%) for those involved in agricultural work 
than those in non-agricultural jobs (around 13.6%). 
 
Many of the transition paths described above are strongly determined by the 
individual characteristics of workers which are not considered above.  The following 
section explores the importance of these characteristics (as well as the characteristics of 
the families from which they come) on income growth and movements out of poverty.  
 
4. MICRO DATA ANALYSIS 
 
LEVELS OF INCOME AND POVERTY IN 1993 AND 2000 
 
In order to identify the determinants of income mobility it is crucial to follow 
individuals and their earnings over time, which can be only accomplished by utilising a 
panel dataset. However, before we turn to a micro-growth regression framework we will 
follow the most common methodology and regress log real personal income using OLS 
on multiple explanatory variables to identify the determinants of the level of real income 
in 1993 and 2000 respectively. Despite the well known methodological limitations of 
endogeneity, omitted variable bias and/or unobserved heterogeneity, etc. we deem the 
OLS level regression still highly informative to gain a better understanding of the 
correlates, if not determinants, of real income levels. Table 5 shows the results of log real   21
income in 1993 and 2000 regressed on a combination of individual, household, 
geographic and employment characteristics.  
This is followed by a logit regression in which the probability of being poor or non-poor 
is determined by the same characteristics which determined personal income. As 
mentioned above, our sample is restricted to individuals who were aged between 15 and 
55 in 1993 and earned an income; their poverty status is determined by whether the per 
capita expenditure of their households fell above or below the poverty line. The poverty 
line used was the BPS provincial rural and urban poverty lines for 2002 deflated to 1996 
prices. Table 5 shows OLS regressions of log real income on a set of explanatory 
variables for both years. 
Several variables are strongly associated with log real income and behave as 
expected considering the theoretical background.  Real income increases with age but 
with a declining rate.  A person who was one year older in 1993 received on average 6.59 
percent more income and 10.3 percent in 2000 (although this later results is in part due to 
the aging of the panel).  Male income is an astonishing 44% higher than female income in 
1993 even when age and education are taking into account.  (Again this gap widens as the 
panel ages as younger women marry and have children reducing their individual income.)   
Years of schooling, as expected, has a strong effect with each additional year of 
schooling raising the level of real income by 8.7 percent in 1993. 
Household level variables also have an impact.  Workers who were part of a large 
household gain on average 6.1 percent more income in 1993 for each additional family 
member. But having a larger number of children below the age of 5 seems to lower real 
income. This effect almost cancels the positive effect of household size suggesting that 
any advantage of having a larger household is lost once on takes small children into 
account. Interestingly the number of men in a household effects average real income 
negatively – having more adult males living in the same household may be an indication 
of poverty (reflected in low individual income) even if their presence in the household 
boosts household income. 
Geographical variables have an extremely strong impact on income.  Individuals 
in urban areas in 1993 earned on average 24 percent more than similar workers in rural   22
areas
13, but this differential had fallen to 5.6 percent by 2000.  This is consistent with the 
results from Table 3 showing that rural income growth was faster than urban income 
growth over this period, primarily because of the economic crisis in 1998.  There are also 
wide variations between incomes in different provinces.  Relative to Jakarta, incomes are 
lower in all provinces with the most pronounced income gaps in 1993 occurring in 
DiYogyakarta, South Sulawesi, Lampung, Central Java, and East Java. This changed 
dramatically in 2000 as Jakarta was badly hit by the crisis, reducing the income disparity 
between it and the other provinces. 
Economic and sectoral variables also have an influence. Deriving income 
predominantly from wages does appear to raise income slightly, but the effect turns 
negative and is usually not statistically insignificant in 2000.  Working more hours also 
increases income – but the effect is rather small.  By contrast there are large sectoral 
differences in income.  Working primarily in the non-farm sector boosts real income in 
1993 by 44.8 percent relative to agricultural activities, although this advantage declined 
to 26.5 percent in 2000. If one looks at the specific sectors of employment there are large 
disparities relative to agriculture - Finance (72%), Mining Quarry (72%), and Social 
Services (60%) display particularly large differentials.  These differences were 
substantially reduced between 1993 and 2000 due to the poor performance of many of 
these sectors relative to agriculture over this period.  
It is not surprising that the logit poverty regressions confirm and strengthen our 
OLS regression results as can be seen in table 6 below. Even though we determine the 
poverty status by being per capita household expenditure poor and not individual earning 
poor these two concepts are strongly linked in particular if the sample is restricted to 
income earners. Hence, as we expect, being older and more educated reduces on average 
the chance of being poor. Unsurprisingly, now household size clearly displays a positive 
probability of being poor as does the number of children below the age of five. Being 
male increases the probability of being poor, which is consistent with the results above, 
as most females in Indonesia might earn individually less than males even after 
controlling for characteristics, but they are often the secondary earner in the household, 
                                                 
13 This difference is likely to be overstated since real income is deflated by provincial CPI which is based 
upon the prices in the provinces main city.    23
thus their probability of being household expenditure poor is most likely lower, given that 
the sample is restricted to earners. Interestingly this positive probability disappeared until 
2000 suggesting that either males managed to increase their earning situation 
considerably or that women lost out comparably. 
Living in urban areas increase the probability of being poor in both 1993 and 
2000, but the higher coefficient on the 2000 urban dummy suggests that the probability of 
being poor has increased for those living in urban areas. However, these results have to 
be interpreted to some extent in combination with the sectoral employment variable 
which reduces the probability of poverty considerably with respect to agriculture in 
particular in the 1993 sample. A further conformation of our results above, which 
suggested a weaker but improving income position of the provinces with respect to 
Jakarta, is that the probability of being poor increases in the provinces, but that this 
probability declined between 1993 and 2000. 
The level regressions above confirm many of the expected and hypothesized links 
from the literature between personal, household, sectoral and regional characteristics as 
determinants of income and poverty. However, they can’t tell us much about the 
dynamics of income and poverty for which we need micro-growth models or difference 
regressions which utilize panel datasets to identify the determinants of income and 
poverty change.  
 
MICRO GROWTH OR DIFFERENCE REGRESSIONS 
 
The above estimation looks at the determinants of income levels.  But what are 
the determinants of income change? We estimate a difference regression on initial 
characteristics and changes in those characteristics.  In particular we are interested to see 
if the change of sector has an important impact upon income growth. 
First to notice is that log real income has a negative coefficient implying a faster 
growth rate for the initially poorer or in other words conditional income convergence, 
after controlling for all the other characteristics, which is a common finding in the 
literature. Even more interesting is that we even find absolute convergence of income as 
shown in table 8 regression (3) below implying declining income inequality, as the   24
coefficient on initial log real income is negative and highly significant implying that the 
initial poorer, no matter what their characteristics, had subsequent higher income 
growth
14.  
In table 7 the inclusion of an interaction term of migration and initial income 
(PmoveIniY, KmoveIniY, KemoveIniY) lowers the initial income coefficient only 
slightly in regressions (2) and (4). Furthermore, older (3.8% average higher growth rate 
per year but declining with rising age, - negative age2 coefficient) and male workers 
(44%) experienced significantly higher average income growth then female and younger 
workers. People with higher working hours in 1993 experienced higher subsequent 
income growth, probably reflecting a more formal occupation. Interestingly, the negative 
coefficient of the change of working hours suggest that people who increased their 
working hours suffered from lower income growth. One possible interpretation is that 
people with particularly strong income decline tried to compensate by working over-
proportionally to cushion their income loss. Being educated in 1993 also contributed 
positively to the subsequent income growth. The variable years of schooling is highly 
significant and robust, suggesting that schooling raised subsequent income increases 
(around 6% higher average income growth rate per extra year of schooling) no matter 
what the sectoral employment of the individual.  
Taking a closer look at the household characteristics it seems to be the case that 
individuals of larger households which have many children and male members seem to 
experience subsequent less income growth which often should outweigh the positive 
impact of having a larger household in general. As suggested above this might reflect the 
fact that having more adult males and more small children living in the same household 
may be an indication of poverty and reflects low individual income level, but also lower 
subsequent income change. 
Obviously, it is important to control for regional variation especially in such a 
diverse country setting as Indonesia. However, the coefficients on the regional dummies 
only display regional specific effects after controlling for all other variables, in particular 
                                                 
14 This confirms also G Fields et al (2003) results concerning declining inequality for Indonesia between 
1993 – 1997. Considering that the rich lost disproportionately more of their income than the poor than the 
trend in decreasing inequality should have continued (keeping in mind that loosing 10% of their income 
might be more devastating for the poor than 20% income loss for the rich.   25
initial income. Hence, they are the measure of our ignorance, as they display the regional 
variation unexplained by the model specification. As most provincial dummies display 
negative coefficients in the regressions above it is reasonable to assume that the general 
provincial economic framework, infrastructure and institutions are weaker as compared to 
Jakarta so that subsequent individual income change is lower in the provinces compared 
to the capital, after controlling for all the other factors. However, if one looks at table 8, 
in which we regress only regional dummies on individual income change, we see positive 
coefficients on all provincial dummies implying that the individuals living in these 
provinces experienced on average higher income growth than their counterparts in Jakarta 
which was comparably hard hit by the crisis. However, once we control for initial income 
level all the coefficients on the regional dummies turn negative as the income 
convergence is now captured in the initial income term as we showed already above that 
the income level was on average much lower in the provinces as compared to the capital 
in particular in 1993.  
Another hypothesis we wanted to test for was that people which migrate do so to 
better themselves in terms of income. The variables provincial move dummy, kabubaten 
move dummy and kecamatan move dummy in table 7 above take the value one if the 
individual migrated to a different province, kabubaten or kecamatan over the given time 
period respectively. The results of the dummies are statistically insignificant in 
specifications (1). However, once we interact initial income with the migration dummy in 
specifications (2) a very interesting pattern emerges. People who move province and 
kecamatan better themselves significantly, but only if they were initially less well off.  
The negative coefficients on the migration initial income interaction dummy suggest that 
rich people moved provinces or location in responses to crisis, but that the poor migrate 
to increase their income. This supports some theoretical beliefs that labour is mobile and 
seeks higher income opportunities, but this preposition seems to hold mostly for the poor, 
the overwhelming proportion of rich people migrate probably as a response to a income 
decline not to better themselves. Furthermore, there seems to be two distinct effects of 
close proxy (kecamatan) and long range (provincial) migration. People who migrate in 
close proximity most likely know how and what they are earning at their destination and 
manage to experience on average higher income growth. Where as provincial migration   26
could possible be of a less informed economic opportunity seeking type. However, to test 
this hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper. 
In order to analyse the impact of sectoral occupation choice on subsequent income 
change we have to look at the variables stay non-farm or move to agriculture for those 
originally earning income in 1993 in the non-farm sector. Alternatively, the variable 
move to non-farm is for those who where engaged in agriculture in 1993 and moved to 
the non-farm sector; the omitted variable being those individuals remaining in 
agriculture. Those who where engaged in non-farm activities in 1993 and stayed in the 
non-farm sector experienced higher than average income growth, even after controlling 
for personal characteristics, in the subsequent period, as compared to individuals engaged 
and remaining in agriculture. Moreover, individuals who moved from the non-farm sector 
to agriculture did not seem to experience significantly different income growth compared 
to those remaining in agriculture. Interestingly, Individuals who attempted to move from 
agriculture to the non-farm sector seem to have experienced comparable income growth 
to those remaining in agriculture, keeping in mind that the regression already controls for 
individual characteristics, as for example more educated individuals
15 attempt to move 
into the non-farm sectors which experience on average a higher income growth rate. 
However, and probably unsurprisingly, it is clear that those who move to the non-farm 
sector experience a slight general disadvantage after controlling for personal 




  The micro-growth regression above gives us the determinants of income growth, 
but it tells us nothing specific about poverty dynamics yet. In order to determine what 
factors increase the likelihood of exiting or falling into poverty we need to run logit 
regressions on restricted samples. First we restrict the sample to people classified poor in 
1993 and run a logit on the binary variable leaving poverty or remaining poor
16 which 
                                                 
15 Median years of schooling equals 5 years for those who moved into the non-farm sector as compared to 3 
years for those remaining in agriculture 
16 Being poor is defined as above as being poor if the individuals household expenditure per capita is below 
the poverty line   27
indicated to us how likely it is that a person exits poverty, given certain characteristics. 
Our second sample is of people considered non-poor in 1993, where the binary variable 
here is entering poverty or remaining non-poor which indicates how likely it is that a 
person falls into poverty. Before we turn to this more informative analysis we want to 
establish using a first naïve model, in which we run a logit regression on exiting poverty 
based on the pathways described in figure 1 above, which pathways out of poverty were 
most successful in general, without any consideration for individual or other 
characteristics. The results are shown in table 9 below.  
The coefficients in table 9 correspond directly to the pathways out of poverty 
highlighted in figure 1 above. Regression (1) controls for initial conditions and regression 
(2) is the true naïve model. It shows that poor people
17 who were staying in the non-farm 
sector and moved to the non-farm sector increased their probability to exit poverty 
considerably (pathway 2 and A) compared to those who stayed in agriculture (pathway 
1). Interestingly, staying in an urban area at least negated the positive impact of 
remaining in the non-farm sector
18 implying that poor urban dwellers in the non-farm 
sector had an equally good chance of escaping poverty as did the rural poor remaining in 
agriculture. The urban move dummy is not significant, which again is probably due to the 
general greater impact of the crisis on the urban centres. Interestingly, the rural move 
dummy suggests a tendency for urban dwellers that moved back to the countryside to 
escape poverty with a higher probability compared to those remaining in rural 
agriculture
19. Moreover, rural poor individuals who moved to the non-farm sector or 
remained in the non-farm sector had a disproportionately higher chance of escaping 
poverty between 1993 and 2000 than their poor counterparts remaining in rural 
agriculture or urban non-farm income earners. 
The naïve model above suggest which pathway out of poverty displayed the 
highest probability to escape poverty, namely the rural non-farm sector, but it tells us 
nothing about the characteristics of those who managed to take advantage of these higher 
probabilities. Hence, we must run a logit regression of exiting poverty on personal 
                                                 
17 Poor people corresponds to those who earned income in 1993, but were household expenditure poor 
18 this two variables must probably be looked at jointly as almost all urban dwellers are engaged in nonfarm 
activities 
19 This corresponds well to the income transition matrixs which suggest that urban non-farm earners 
moving to rural non-farm enterprises had rather high income growth rates   28
characteristics and other determinants to identify the comparable “winners” who had the 
best chances to escape poverty. Table 10 below shows the results of two different logit 
regression with two different specifications per regression. Regressions (1) and (2) 
identifies the determinants which increased or decreased the individual’s probability of 
exiting poverty given that the individual was poor in 1993 and regressions (3) and (4) 
shows the determinants which correspond to the probabilities of falling into poverty 
given that the individual was non-poor in 1993. 
Table 10 confirms many of the hypothesized determinants of poverty mobility and 
strengthens our results above. Unsurprisingly, it is clear that being an earner in a larger or 
growing household reduces the relative probability of exiting and increases the chance of 
entering poverty respectively.
20 Two things are particularly noteworthy concerning the 
household characteristics variables. Firstly, households which have a child over the 
period are more likely to exit poverty. This most likely reflects some reverse causality, 
namely, only parents who better themselves somewhat are deciding to have children
21. 
Hence, adding another child to a household is a sign of affluence and thus it increases the 
probability of exiting poverty or decreases the chance of entering poverty. However, this 
result has to interpreted with care and jointly with changes in the household size in 
general
22, which almost mitigates the positive coefficient. Secondly, above we have seen 
that the number of men in a household is negatively correlated with the level of income 
and individual income growth. However, looking at the people in poverty and their 
respective household earnings it seems clear that having and adding more men in a 
household increases the poor household chance to exit poverty thus having many men in 
a given household might reflect low individual income level in general and less 
individual income increases, but it serves clearly as a informal safety net to improve 
household income by pooling the individual income of many, if poor, male earners. 
Moreover, having many males within a given non-poor household seems to be a sign of 
poverty vulnerability as it clearly increases the chances of the poor household to enter 
poverty. 
                                                 
20 Considering that poverty status is being determined by per capita household expenditure 
21 Given the possibility of even very simple birth controls 
22 Even though not all change in hh size will be due to new children   29
Furthermore, initial income is, as expected, clearly associated with increased or 
decreased probability of leaving or entering poverty respectively. The negative 
coefficient on the increase of working hours in regression (1) confirms our results above 
that individual that are facing reduced income are trying to mitigate their income loss by 
expending their working hours. Hence, increasing working hours is another sign of a 
poverty copying strategy and has a negative associated probability of exiting poverty.  
Furthermore, wage earners have seen a higher probability of entering poverty (coefficient 
on wage income dummy regression (2)) after controlling for all other characteristics 
implying that formerly non-poor formal employees had a higher likelihood of entering 
poverty. 
Another interesting finding is that urban households had a harder time exiting 
poverty than their rural counterparts and a greater likelihood of entering poverty. This is 
to some degree associated with the idiosyncratic impact of the Asian crisis on the urban 
centres. However, this variable has to be interpreted with some care, as many other 
variables, namely initial income, years of schooling and non-farm enterprises, are 
stronger associated with urban locations and of opposite sign. Thus, controlling for all 
other things, urban dwellers had a lower probability of escaping poverty, but obviously 
their initial endowment mitigated this disadvantage tremendously. In particular, years of 
schooling has the hypothesized strong impact on poverty dynamics. Especially the impact 
of increased education increases the likelihood of exiting poverty and vice versa is strong 
and very robust, even after controlling for all possible other characteristics.  
Turning to the spatial determinants of poverty it is interesting to note that none of 
the regional dummies has a statistically significant probability associated with exiting 
poverty. However, there are various provinces which have an associated high positive 
likelihood of entering poverty even after taking the impact of the other determinants into 
account. This suggests that certain provinces have been particularly vulnerable to poverty 
compared to Jakarta in the period 1993 to 2000, namely all of Java (except central java), 
large part of Sumatra, Bali and West Nusa Tenggara. Moreover, our provincial and 
kabubaten migration dummy has a significant positive likelihood of exiting poverty. This 
implies that a poor individual who migrates to a different province or kabubaten increases 
his/her chance of exiting poverty. Conversely, for the non-poor moving to a different   30
province might be the reaction to an income loss, however, the associated positive 
likelihood in regression (2) is not statistically significant. Thus it seems that migration is, 
on the one hand, a means for the poor to better themselves, but on the other hand also a 
reaction to income loss, which is a plausible and possible reason for the migration 
variables in the income difference regression in table 7 to be insignificant in specification 
(1) and significant once interacted with initial income levels in specifications (2). 
Moreover, looking at the sectoral characteristics, it is interesting to note that the 
probability of individuals who were 1993 in the agriculture sector and moved to the non-
farm sector had a higher then average likelihood to exit poverty, even after controlling for 
many personal characteristics,





To conclude, this paper started with a relatively simple question, namely, what 
were the most successful strategies to escape poverty in Indonesia between 1993 and 
2000, in how far do these pathways correspond to economic theory and what are the 
implied lessons to be learned and policy options to be considered. The presented results 
above suggest that there is not one single or simple answer, but that there are many 
factors which effect poverty dynamics and that a dataset can account, at best, for the 
broad pattern of poverty alleviation. Any attempt to understand poverty dynamics 
utilising aggregate evidence such as the SUSENAS dataset is suffering from severe 
limitations in terms of following individuals over time and ascribing characteristics to the 
individuals who managed to escape poverty. Thus, a deeper understanding of the 
conditions which enhance the chances of individuals to exit poverty must be gained by 
utilising panel datasets. However, this implies the caveat that if we wish to analyse 
change one cannot change the individuals in the dataset over time which necessarily 
implies neglecting “newcomers” which might mean missing some of the dynamics.  
Unfortunately, there is no easy methodological answer or an unlimited and 
universally applicable dataset, so we are concentrating on what is possible given the data 
                                                 
23 Significant at the 10% level   31
and methodological limitations. The aggregate evidence seems to suggest that the most 
dynamic sector was the urban non-farm sector. Looking at the SUSENAS data the urban 
non-farm sector generated above average number of new employment opportunities and 
expanded the most. However, there are two caveats one needs to consider. Firstly, the 
aggregate number of urban dwellers might experience an above average increase due to 
new administrative boarder drawing and thus display an upward bias. Secondly, the 
number of urban dwellers might swell in particular due to young people that are not 
included in the micro dataset, thus they will not show up in the micro panel analysis. 
However, this tells us little about the individual characteristics of those who entered the 
urban non-farm sector or escaped rural poverty. Yet, this is the focus of this papers, - an 
understanding of the poverty dynamics. 
  The limitation of the IFLS panel dataset used is that we restrict our sample to the 
poor individuals who earned income in 1993. Thus, all our results concerning poverty 
dynamics are to be considered for those people who were poor and earned an income in 
1993, which also means leaving out the “newcomers” and unemployed. Nevertheless, it is 
the only way which allows a thorough investigation of the dynamics of poverty change 
especially in combination with earned income and sectoral employment choice and 
change. There are a few conclusions which emerge looking at the micro dataset evidence. 
Firstly, most poor rural farmers exited poverty by increasing their productivity or 
engaging increasingly in rural non-farm agriculture, very few moved to urban areas. 
Secondly, for the rural poor people rural non-farm activities are a stepping stone out of 
rural poverty, seldom urban non-farm employment
24. Thirdly, people engaged in urban 
non-farm activities are the least mobile, probably because their real and potential income 
is so much higher in general. Lastly, the chance of exiting rural poverty where actually 
higher than the chances of exiting urban poverty, the vulnerability, however, of falling 
back into poverty was much higher for agriculture than for non-farm jobs.  
So what were the determinants of income levels and thus poverty? Our results 
identify the usual determinants of income level and poverty, namely, male, older, non-
farm and more educated earners where those who had the highest income level and the 
lowest probability of being classified poor. This leads us directly to the next question, 
                                                 
24 The later case is most likely only true for the young    32
who where those who were poor in 1993 that managed to raise their income? Our micro 
growth regressions results show that the main economic losers in terms of forgone 
income growth were mostly female, young, rural, and engaged and remaining in farm 
activities. Moreover, they show an absolute convergence of income in Indonesia over the 
given time period, additionally the provinces grew comparably faster then Jakarta. 
However, all other things being equal, the provinces still displayed a growth disadvantage 
suggesting the need for better market integration, institutional set-up and infrastructure 
investment outside the capital. A further interesting result was that the poor seem to 
migrate in order to increase their income where as the rich tend to migrate to mitigate 
income loss. 
Directly connected to the micro-growth regression results is the likelihood 
analysis of exiting and entering poverty. The results from our dynamic poverty analysis 
indicate that, indeed, the main pathway out of poverty is to be found in the increased 
engagement of individuals in non-farm enterprises which significantly increases one’s 
chance of escaping poverty, as households engaged in non-farm activities enjoy a higher 
average income and thus are less likely to be poor, not only in the way of diversified 
production, but in terms of increased productivity and thus income. Hence, the non-farm 
economy plays a crucial mediating role in the structural transformation process of 
Indonesia and thus the long term increases of average productivity levels which is 
implicitly needed for effective poverty reduction. However, being educated is by far the 
most robust effect as it increases the individual’s chance of exiting poverty tremendously 
and it is the most effective insurance against falling into poverty. Moreover, we argue 
that being educated is a prerequisite to engage in higher productivity level non-farm 
activities, which are the main engine behind poverty change. Thus, educating the poor 
and removing physical constraints to the development of rural non-farm enterprises 
should ensure the most effective continuation of poverty reduction in Indonesia. 
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Table 3: Income Growth transitions by rural, urban and sector 1993-2000 
 
Note: Data is for individuals who were aged between 15-55 in 1993 and were working in both years. Income figures are median monthly income 
in Rupiah in 1996 prices.  Incomes are in Rupiah in 1996 prices.  Income values and percentage changes in each cell represent the median incomes 
and percentage change in income of those individuals who made that transition. 
 
 
         2000 
        Rural  Urban    
    
Starting 






Obs Nonfarm  #  Obs 
Average 
Ending 
income #  Obs 
 Rural  Farm 48,470  1,591 40,660  1,268 79,660  275  22,305 31  107,177 17  44,868  1,591 
    -12%  29%    -83%  77%  -8% 
    Nonfarm 103,792  1,415  50,006 329 121,182 984  49,788  18 150,425  84 109,966  1,415 
1993     -47%  10%   -51%   -10%    6% 
 Urban  Farm 90,049  293  101,827  52  118,379  15  79,019  143  93,485  83  92,595  293 
    -17%   -25%   4%   8%    3% 
  Nonfarm  192,893  2,220  0  24  269,483  109  90,356  111  176,623 1,976  176,623 2,220 
    -100%  25%   -39%   -7%   -9% 
  All    95,904  5,519   1,673   1,383    303    2,160    5,519   38
Table 4: Poverty Transition Matrix  
 
          2000 
         Poor Non  Poor  Total 
         Rural Urban Rural Urban     
     
# 
individuals  Agriculture 
Non 
Agriculture  Agriculture 
Non 
Agriculture  Agriculture 
Non 
Agriculture  Agriculture 
Non 
Agriculture    
Agriculture  713  38.7 5.8 0.6 0.4  43.0 9.6 1.1 0.8  100.0 
Rural  Non 
Agriculture  375 18.5 18.1  1.9  2.8 13.6 40.4  0.1  4.7 100.0 






Urban  Non 
Agriculture  296 0.0 0.5 5.3  44.6 0.0 1.4 2.8  45.4  100.0 
Agriculture  1,053  15.4 3.6 0.3 0.0  61.5  16.5 1.8 0.9  100.0  Rural 
Non 
Agriculture  1,389 4.4 8.4 0.0 1.7  17.1  62.2 1.2 5.0  100.0 















Urban  Non 
Agriculture  1,301 0.3 0.3 0.7  11.4 1.2 5.3 3.2  77.6  100.0 
        Total  5,307 578 269  78 333  1,284  1,340 143  1,284  100.0 
               10.9 5.1 1.5 6.3  24.2  25.3 2.7  24.2    
 
Note: Data are percentage of individuals in the category in 1993 who end up in the 2000 category.  The individuals are those who were aged 15-55 
in 1993 and were working.   39
Table 5: The Determinants of Log Real Income in 1993 and 2000  
    1993   1993   2000   2000 
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
        Log Real Income    Log Real Income 
Age     0.090   0.086   0.103   0.098 
        (5.37)** (5.03)** (5.57)** (5.27)** 
Age  Squared    -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
        (4.99)** (4.75)** (5.84)** (5.60)** 
Sex     0.440   0.444   0.597   0.608 
        (11.53)** (11.20)** (15.60)** (15.24)** 
Working-hours/month  0.002   0.002   0.001   0.001 
    (12.37)**  (12.40)**  (6.64)**  (6.81)** 
Wage Income Dummy   0.088   0.072   -0.023  -0.050 
    (2.53)*  (1.85) (0.66) (1.29) 
Years of Schooling  0.087   0.081   0.103   0.097 
        (21.76)** (18.63)** (25.73)** (22.19)** 
Household Size    0.061   0.063   0.059   0.058 
        (4.02)** (4.13)** (4.61)** (4.59)** 
Number  of  Children  <  5  -0.071 -0.071 -0.065 -0.064 
    (2.75)**  (2.74)**  (2.28)*  (2.24)* 
Number of Children < 15 -0.041  -0.040  -0.038  -0.036 
        (2.19)* (2.14)* (2.12)* (2.04)* 
Number of Men in hh  -0.049  -0.052  -0.038  -0.036 
    (2.61)**  (2.73)**  (2.10)*  (2.00)* 
Urban Dummy     0.240   0.244   0.056   0.069 
    (7.01)**  (7.18)**  (1.50) (1.84) 
North  Sumatra   -0.184 -0.181 -0.114 -0.095 
    (2.56)*  (2.50)*  (1.54) (1.28) 
West  Sumatra  -0.225 -0.231 -0.255 -0.258 
        (2.98)** (3.02)** (2.66)** (2.68)** 
South  Sumatra   -0.453 -0.470 -0.179 -0.177 
    (5.72)**  (5.88)**  (2.08)*  (2.03)* 
Lampung    -0.577 -0.576 -0.300 -0.296 
        (6.71)** (6.65)** (3.31)** (3.25)** 
West  Java    -0.326 -0.307 -0.050 -0.048 
    (5.71)**  (5.32)**  (0.82) (0.77) 
Central  Java  -0.597 -0.583 -0.293 -0.269 
        (9.80)** (9.41)** (4.68)** (4.26)** 
DiYogyakarta  -0.711 -0.706 -0.461 -0.449 
    (10.59)**  (10.62)**  (6.15)**  (5.99)** 
East  Java    -0.573 -0.561 -0.250 -0.237 
        (9.82)** (9.56)** (4.02)** (3.78)** 
Bali     -0.255 -0.271 -0.139 -0.155 
    (3.75)**  (3.95)**  (1.80) (1.99)* 
West Nusa Tenggara -0.445 -0.450 -0.218 -0.213 
        (5.04)** (5.05)** (2.92)** (2.85)** 
South  Kalimantan   -0.072 -0.091 -0.105 -0.119 
    (1.00) (1.25) (1.21) (1.37) 
South  Sulawesi   -0.517 -0.517 -0.358 -0.363 
        (6.06)** (6.11)** (3.48)** (3.53)** 
Non-farm  Dummy   0.440     0.265   
    (9.99)**    (5.81)**   
Mining  Quarry     0.726     0.537 
      (6.59)**    (3.66)** 
Manufacturing     0.288     0.106 
      (4.78)**    (1.61)   40
Electricity      0.534     0.345 
      (4.23)**    (1.26) 
Construction    0.429     0.248 
      (6.40)**    (4.01)** 
Wholesale      0.470     0.269 
      (8.80)**    (4.93)** 
Transport      0.416     0.112 
      (6.62)**    (1.58) 
Finance      0.720     0.609 
      (5.14)**    (4.60)** 
Social  Services     0.594     0.420 
      (10.02)**    (7.29)** 
Constant    8.397   8.513   8.089   8.234 
        (26.09)** (25.99)** (20.19)** (20.43)** 
Observations  4831   4831   4535   4535 
R-squared    0.38   0.39   0.32   0.32 
Robust t statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%          41
Table 6: Logit Cross Sectional Poverty Regression 
    1993   1993   2000   2000 
        Household Expenditure per Capita Poor 
Age     -0.106 -0.105 -0.160 -0.159 
    (2.17)*  (2.17)*  (3.46)**  (3.40)** 
Age Squared     0.001   0.001   0.002   0.002 
    (2.24)*  (2.26)*  (3.67)**  (3.63)** 
Sex     0.274   0.280   0.053   -0.107 
    (2.48)*  (2.40)*  (0.52) (1.01) 
Working-hours/month  -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
        (4.20)** (3.97)** (2.79)** (2.98)** 
Wage Income Dummy   0.203   0.156   0.235   0.152 
    (2.12)*  (1.41) (2.50)*  (1.46) 
Years  of  Schooling -0.166 -0.167 -0.194 -0.184 
        (11.85)** (11.41)** (16.71)** (15.04)** 
Household Size    0.188   0.185   0.242   0.248 
        (4.05)** (4.02)** (7.77)** (7.95)** 
Number of Children < 5  0.357   0.361   0.225   0.213 
        (4.96)** (5.01)** (3.15)** (2.98)** 
Number of Children < 15 0.004   0.004   0.051   0.044 
    (0.07) (0.07) (1.06) (0.90) 
Number of Men in hh  -0.030  -0.026  0.004   0.000 
    (0.60) (0.51) (0.09) (0.00) 
Urban Dummy     0.318   0.316   0.627   0.644 
        (2.95)** (2.93)** (5.89)** (5.98)** 
North Sumatra    0.902   0.890   0.392   0.316 
    (2.94)**  (2.91)**  (1.50) (1.20) 
West  Sumatra  -0.026 -0.053 0.810   0.716 
    (0.07) (0.15) (2.92)**  (2.57)* 
South Sumatra    1.475   1.478   1.214   1.149 
        (4.77)** (4.76)** (4.52)** (4.27)** 
Lampung    1.767   1.732   1.099   1.041 
        (5.63)** (5.53)** (3.85)** (3.66)** 
West Java      1.068   1.024   1.019   0.969 
        (3.82)** (3.67)** (4.59)** (4.36)** 
Central Java    1.750   1.706   0.758   0.675 
        (6.26)** (6.13)** (3.34)** (2.97)** 
DiYogyakarta  2.152   2.114   1.360   1.258 
        (7.27)** (7.12)** (5.55)** (5.09)** 
East Java      2.239   2.221   1.185   1.134 
        (8.12)** (8.07)** (5.26)** (5.06)** 
Bali     0.904   0.894   0.886   0.863 
        (2.96)** (2.93)** (3.51)** (3.41)** 
West Nusa Tenggara  1.158   1.127   1.091   1.052 
        (3.70)** (3.61)** (4.40)** (4.25)** 
South Kalimantan    0.914   0.907   0.668   0.619 
    (2.87)**  (2.84)**  (2.40)*  (2.22)* 
South Sulawesi    1.076   1.032   0.583   0.511 
    (3.09)**  (2.98)**  (2.03)*  (1.76) 
Non-farm  Dummy   -0.708   -0.445  
    (6.55)**    (4.21)**   
Mining  Quarry     -1.791   0.230 
      (2.93)**    (0.60) 
Manufacturing     -0.495   -0.297 
      (3.22)**    (1.89) 
Electricity      -0.806   -1.384   42
      (1.56)   (1.35) 
Construction    -0.493   0.037 
      (2.33)*    (0.18) 
Wholesale      -0.805   -0.751 
      (5.75)**    (5.39)** 
Transport      -0.862   0.128 
      (4.26)**    (0.66) 
Finance      -0.731   
      (1.16)   
Social  Services     -0.723   -0.767 
      (3.54)**    (4.82)** 
Constant    -0.435 -0.440 0.728   0.873 
    (0.45) (0.46) (0.69) (0.81) 
Observations  4831   4831   4534   4504 
Robust z statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         43
Table 7: Micro-growth or income difference regression of Difference in Log Real 
Income 1993-2000     
     
     (1)    (2) 
          Difference in Log Real Income 1993-2000 
Log Real Income 1993    -0.605    -0.545 
     (21.54)**   (15.96)** 
Age      0.038    0.037 
     (2.15)*   (2.09)* 
Age  Squared     -0.001  -0.001 
     (2.58)**   (2.53)* 
Sex      0.448    0.443 
     (9.91)**   (9.86)** 
Working-hours/Month 1993  0.001     0.001 
     (2.53)*   (2.56)* 
Differences     -0.002  -0.002 
Working-hours/Month 1993  (6.59)**    (6.69)** 
Wage Income Dummy 1993    0.033     0.035 
     (0.82)  (0.86) 
Years of Schooling    0.062     0.062 
     (11.29)**   (11.24)** 
Household Size      0.056     0.055 
     (3.88)**   (3.83)** 
Difference     0.042    0.044 
Household  Size    (1.72)  (1.84) 
Number of Children < 5    -0.092    -0.091 
     (2.24)*   (2.21)* 
Difference     0.063    0.061 
Number of Children < 5    (1.88)    (1.83) 
Number of Men in hh    -0.035    -0.036 
     (1.65)  (1.68) 
Difference     -0.026  -0.027 
Number of Men in hh    (0.79)    (0.84) 
Urban  Dummy     -0.037  -0.035 
     (0.92)  (0.88) 
North  Sumatra    -0.191  -0.271 
     (2.17)*   (3.04)** 
West  Sumatra   -0.160  -0.230 
     (1.42)  (2.03)* 
South  Sumatra    -0.079  -0.116 
     (0.80)  (1.17) 
Lampung     -0.170  -0.264 
     (1.64)  (2.45)* 
West  Java     -0.041  -0.098 
     (0.62)  (1.43) 
Central  Java   -0.064  -0.113 
     (0.87)  (1.51) 
DiYogyakarta   -0.202  -0.258 
     (2.28)*   (2.89)** 
East  Java     -0.089  -0.147 
     (1.24)  (2.00)* 
Bali      0.094    0.028 
     (1.10)  (0.33) 
West Nusa Tenggara    -0.021    -0.065 
     (0.22)  (0.69)   44
South  Kalimantan    -0.115  -0.156 
     (1.47)  (1.95) 
South  Sulawesi    -0.078  -0.148 
     (0.73)  (1.36) 
Provincial  Move  Dummy   -0.157  2.963 
     (1.22)  (2.28)* 
Kabubaten Move Dummy    0.081     -0.543 
     (1.15)  (0.72) 
Kecamatan Move Dummy    0.058     1.352 
     (1.31)  (2.67)** 
Stay Non-farm      0.151     0.147 
     (2.48)*   (2.41)* 
Move to Non-farm      0.004     -0.006 
     (0.04)  (0.07) 
Move to Agriculture    -0.075    -0.089 
     (0.79)  (0.95) 
PmoveIniY        -0.263 
        (2.47)* 
KmoveIniY        0.056 
        (0.89) 
KemoveIniY        -0.112 
        (2.59)** 
Constant     5.452    4.851 
     (12.68)**   (10.12)** 
Observations   3979    3979 
R-squared     0.31    0.31 
Robust t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%    
Note: All variables, which are not difference variables, are from the IFLS 1993. So the dependent variable 
captures subsequent real income change conditioned on the initial explanatory variables and their 
subsequent change. 
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Table 8: Geographic and Absolute Convergence 
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
    Difference  Log  Real  Income 
North  Sumatra   0.126   -0.176  
    (1.38) (2.22)*   
West  Sumatra  0.156   -0.158  
    (1.37) (1.44)  
South  Sumatra   0.435   -0.074  
    (3.74)**  (0.74)  
Lampung    0.468   -0.148  
    (3.99)**  (1.44)  
West  Java    0.275   -0.079  
    (3.66)**  (1.18)  
Central  Java  0.400   -0.138  
    (5.46)**  (1.93)  
DiYogyakarta  0.237   -0.221  
    (2.83)**  (2.62)**   
East  Java    0.340   -0.150  
    (4.49)**  (2.10)*   
Bali     0.350   -0.027  
    (4.22)**  (0.34)  
West Nusa Tenggara  0.363   -0.110   
    (3.47)**  (1.23)  
South  Kalimantan   0.096   -0.194  
    (1.08) (2.40)*   
South  Sulawesi   0.378   -0.041  
    (3.59)**  (0.41)  
Log Real Income 1993      -0.432  -0.425 
      (18.38)**  (19.34)** 
Constant    -0.227 5.195   4.998 
    (4.28)**  (17.42)**  (19.40)** 
Observations  3983   3983   3983 
R-squared    0.01   0.19   0.19 
Robust t statistics in parentheses       
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       46
Table 9: Logit regression dependent variable exit out of poverty (1993-2000, given 
poverty status in 1993) 
    (1)    (2) 
    Exit  Poverty  
Log Real Income 1993  0.241  
    (2.71)**   
Stay  Urban    -0.892  -0.794 
    (4.41)**   (3.98)** 
Move to Rural    0.593     0.783 
    (1.10)  (1.45) 
Move to Urban    -0.402    -0.279 
    (0.71)  (0.51) 
Stay Non-farm    0.655     0.792 
    (3.08)**   (3.73)** 
Move to Non-farm    0.747     0.816 
    (2.57)*   (2.85)** 
Move to Agriculture  -0.140    0.010 
    (0.45)  (0.03) 
Constant    -2.535  -0.014 
    (2.66)**   (0.10) 
Observations  887    887 
Robust z statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%    
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Table 10: Logit regression of entereing and leaving poverty (1993-2000) 
 
        Move out of poverty  Move into Poverty 
    (1)     (2)    
Log Real Income 1993      0.273       -0.335 
     (2.52)*    (4.36)** 
Age      0.041     -0.109 
     (0.49)   (1.83) 
Age  Squared     -0.001   0.002 
     (0.74)   (2.00)* 
Sex      -0.066   0.238 
     (0.30)   (1.44) 
Working-hours/month  1993 0.002     0.000 
     (1.21)   (0.50) 
Difference     -0.002   0.001 
Working-hours/month  1993 (2.41)*    (1.30) 
Wage Income Dummy     -0.106      0.351 
     (0.57)   (2.36)* 
Years of Schooling    0.136       -0.151 
     (4.54)**    (7.55)** 
Household  Size    -0.295   0.136 
     (3.77)**    (2.26)* 
Difference     -0.367   0.257 
Household  Size     (2.93)**     (3.81)** 
Number  of  Children  <  5   -0.429   0.377 
     (1.93)   (2.29)* 
Difference     0.390     -0.298 
Number of Children < 5    (2.05)*      (2.34)* 
Number of Men in hh    0.161       0.194 
     (1.68)   (2.22)* 
Difference     0.336     -0.079 
Number of Men in hh    (1.97)*      (0.76) 
Urban  Dummy     -0.805   0.467 
     (3.73)**    (2.86)** 
North  Sumatra    -0.300   0.027 
     (0.28)   (0.07) 
West  Sumatra   0.409     1.170 
     (0.35)   (3.11)** 
SoSumatra     0.161     0.982 
     (0.15)   (2.79)** 
Lampung     -0.225   0.291 
     (0.20)   (0.69) 
West  Java     0.101     0.799 
     (0.10)   (2.78)** 
Central  Java   0.389     0.039 
     (0.38)   (0.12) 
DiYogyakarta   -0.106   0.775 
     (0.10)   (2.23)* 
East  Java     0.548     0.869 
     (0.54)   (2.75)** 
Bali      0.360     0.667 
     (0.34)   (1.91) 
West Nusa Tenggara    0.628       1.150 
     (0.59)   (3.15)** 
South  Kalimantan    0.728     0.499   48
     (0.65)   (1.40) 
South  Sulawesi    1.180     -0.042 
     (1.05)   (0.09) 
Provincial  Move  Dummy   3.261     0.612 
     (2.98)**    (1.27) 
Kabubaten  Move  Dummy   0.724     -0.243 
     (1.73)   (1.03) 
Kecamatan  Move  Dummy   -0.244   -0.072 
     (1.17)   (0.43) 
Stay  Non-farm    0.238     0.089 
     (0.99)   (0.43) 
Move to Non-farm      0.623       -0.088 
     (1.80)   (0.28) 
Move  to  Agriculture   -0.303   0.147 
     (0.97)   (0.55) 
Constant     -2.629   1.956 
     (1.14)   (1.42) 
Observations   886     3093 
Robust z statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%    
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